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ness, in turn, will enhance the overall fairness of the jury system.124
With the prosecutor forbidden to use the peremptory to remove jurors
solely because of their group association, fewer defendants will be tried
by juries from which members of their racial, sexual or other cogniza-
ble group have been excluded. Also, fewer defendants will be able to
exploit the peremptory challenge to produce a jury that gives them an
advantage over both the state and other defendants not so situated. In-
stead of reflecting the judgment of a group shaped by the number of
peremptory challenges available and the racial, sexual or similar char-
acteristics of the defendant and the victim, the jury verdict following
Wheeler is more likely to represent the true judgment of the commu-
nity.1 25
CHRISTOPHER WHITMAN MOORE
Criminal Procedure-Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978: A New Charter for Electronic Intelligence Gathering
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968' stands as the most comprehensive grant of judicial control over
electronic surveillance to date. Section 802 of that Act, however, ex-
pressly disclaimed any intention of imposing restrictions upon the Ex-
ecutive when the national security is at stake.2 The consequence was
124. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at xiii-xiv, 11-12.
125. See id.
1. Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-804, 82 Stat. 197 (1968). Section 802 of title III amended part
I of title 18, United States Code, by adding a new chapter entitled "Chapter 119-Wire Intercep-
tion and Interception of Oral Communication" (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2520
(West 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1979)). Section 803 of title III amended §.605 of the Communications
Act of 1934 (formerly codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964)), to conform with the new chapter, which
was intended to be a comprehensive electronic surveillance statute. Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-357, § 803, 82 Stat. 211 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1976)). See generally S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 89-109, reprinted in [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2177-97.
2. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)
(1970)) (repealed 1978) provided that:
Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934
(48 Stat. 1143; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take
such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential
attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information
deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security infor-
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ten years of continued debate over whether this provision represented
an affirmative grant of surveillance power to the President. Although
the United States Supreme Court has held that no exception to the war-
rant requirement is permitted when government surveillance is directed
at wholly domestic threats to the national security,4 the question of the
existence of such an exception when foreign powers are involved has
remained open. Congress has now intervened, however, by enacting
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the Act).5 By repeal-
ing the controversial section 802 of title III6 and providing an exclusive
charter7 for the conduct of electronic surveillance' aimed at gathering
mation against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chap-
ter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as
he deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Govern-
ment by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to
the structure or existence of the Government. The contents of any wire or oral commu-
nication intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise of the foregoing powers
may be received in evidence in any trial hearing, or other proceeding only where such
interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is
necessary to implement that power.
3. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972);
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); United
States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); United States
v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); United States v. Clay,
430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), rey'don othergrounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971); United States v. Smith,
321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (mem.); United States v. Stone, 305 F. Supp. 75 (D.D.C. 1969)
(mem.).
4. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972); see text accompa-
nying notes 35-37 infra.
5. Pub. L. No. 95-511, §§ 101-301, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (West Cum.
Supp. 1979)). The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 was enacted following four prior,
unsuccessful attempts to pass legislation regulating the use of electronic surveillance within the
United States for foreign intelligence purposes. See S. 3197, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 743, National Security Surveillance Act of 1975, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 2820, Surveillance Practices and Procedures Act of 1973, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); S. 4062, Freedom From Surveillance Act of 1974, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
6. Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 201(c), 92 Stat. 1783 (19 78).
7. Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 201(b), 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (1970));
see S. REp. No. 95-604, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 63-65, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CoNO.
& AD. NEws 5654, 5714-16. The legislators agreed, however, that
the establishment by this act of exclusive means by which the President may conduct
electronic surveillance does not foreclose a different decision by the Supreme Court. The
intent of the conferees is to apply the standard set forth in Justice Jackson's concurring
opinion in the Steel Seizure Case: "When a President takes measures incompatible with
the express or implied will of Congress, his power is at the lowest ebb, for then he can
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any Constitutional power of Con-
gress over the matter."
H. CONF. Rap. No. 95-1720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted/n [1978] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.
NEWS 5798, 5814 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
8. The term "electronic surveillance" is broadly defined by the Act to include the noncon-
sensual acquisition of all domestic radio and wire communications, Pub. L. No. 95-511,
§ 101(f)(l)-(3), 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(f(l)-(3) (West Cum. Supp.
1979)), and the use of any surveillance device in the United States for acquiring information
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foreign intelligence information,9 Congress has attempted to balance
the President's power to conduct foreign affairs and the need to protect
individual liberties.
Under the Act, the Attorney General, upon general authorization
of the President,'" may approve applications" for review by a specially
designated court for orders to conduct such electronic surveillance. Ju-
risdiction to review applications and grant orders lies with any one of
seven district court judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the United
States for staggered seven year terms.' 2 Denials of such applications
are to be appealed to a special three judge court of review and ulti-
mately to the Supreme Court. 3
Approval of applications requires a finding by the judge, based on
the facts submitted by the applicant, that there is probable cause to
believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a "foreign
power"' 4 or an "agent of a foreign power' 5 and that the facilities or
places at which the electronic surveillance is directed are being used or
are about to be used by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
"under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant
would be required for law enforcement purposes." Id. § 101(f)(4) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. §
1801()(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1979)).
9. Id. § 101(e) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1979)) defines "foreign
intelligence information" as
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to,
the ability of the United States to protect against-
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power,
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power, or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a
foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power, or
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to, and
if concerning a United States person is necessary to--
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
Thus information pertaining to a United States person must not only "relate to" these national
defense, national security, or foreign affairs interests, but must also be "necessary to" that end in
order to come within the concept of "foreign intelligence surveillance." Unfortunately, the legisla-
tive history does not satisfactorily distinguish these phrases. See S. REP. No. 95-701, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 31-33, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONrG. & AD. NEWS 5723, 5750-52.
10. Presidential authorization need not accompany Attorney General approval of each appli-
cation. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); see S. REP. No. 95-604, supra note 7, at
42, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5693.
11. The required contents of an application are set forth at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (West Cum.
Supp. 1979).
12. Id. § 1803(a), (d).
13. Id. § 1803(b). The court of review is to be selected from among the federal district and
court of appeals judges. Id.
14. "Foreign power" is defined by § 1801(a) of the Act as
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power.16 Furthermore, the judge must be satisfied that the surveillance
procedures proposed by the applicant reasonably minimize the acquisi-
tion and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of information con-
cerning United States citizens to the extent that such minimization is
consistent with the need for foreign intelligence information.' 7 Finally,
the executive branch must certify to the judge that the information
sought is foreign intelligence information that cannot reasonably be ob-
tained by normal investigative techniques.'" The judge may not look
beyond this certification unless the target is a United States person, I9 in
(I) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the
United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United States
persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be
directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments;
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor,
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United States
persons; or
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
Id. § 1801(a).
15. The Act defines "agent of a foreign power" with respect to persons other than United
States persons, see note 19 infra, to include officers or employees of foreign powers, members of
international terrorist groups, and persons acting on behalf of foreign powers engaged in clandes-
tine intelligence activities within the United States. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(1) (West Cum. Supp.
1979). With respect to all persons, including United States persons, an "agent" is anyone who
knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities, sabotage, or international ter-
rorism for a foreign power, or who knowingly aids or abets any person engaged in those activites.
Id. § 1801(b)(2).
16. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
17. Id. § 1805(a)(4); see Id. § 1801(h).
18. Id. § 1804(a)(7). Each application for an electronic surveillance order must include a
certification
(A) that the certifying official deems the information sought to be foreign intelligence
information;
(B) that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information;
(C) that such information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative tech-
niques;
(D) that designates the type of foreign intelligence information being sought. . . ; and
(E) including a statement of the basis for the certification that-
(i) the information sought is the type of foreign intelligence information desig-
nated, and
(ii) such information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative tech-
niques ....
The legislative history explains that the purpose of the certification requirement is to ensure care-
ful consideration of the case by the responsible official and to avoid use of boilerplate language in
the certification itself. S. RaP. No. 95-604, supra note 7, at 45, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 5696-97.
19. The phrase "United States person" includes United States citizens, permanent resident
aliens, unincorporated associations substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent
resident aliens, and United States-based corporations. Specifically excluded are associations and
corporations that are "foreign powers" under 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). Id.
§ 1801(i).
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20which case he must find that the certification is not clearly erroneous.
Upon making the above findings, the judge must issue an order ap-
proving the use of electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence pur-
poses.'
The Act expressly provides two exceptions to the general warrant
requirements previously enumerated. A court order is not required for
any electronic surveillance that is authorized by the President and certi-
fied by the Attorney General as being directed at communications ex-
clusively between or among "officiar' foreign powers22 or at acquiring
technical intelligence from premises controlled exclusively by such for-
eign powers.2 3 The Attorney General must further certify that there is
no "substantial likelihood" that a United States person will be a party
to the intercepted communcations24 and that the surveillance will con-
form to the minimization procedures required under the Act.25
An emergency electronic surveillance authorized by the Attorney
General is also excepted from the requirement of prior judicial authori-
zation under certain limited circumstances. 26 To come within this ex-
ception, the Attorney General must determine that a factual basis
supporting surveillance under the standards of the Act exists and that
even "with due diligence" a prior court order cannot be obtained in
20. Id. § 1805(a)(5). Thus, in all cases in which a United States person is not a target of the
surveillance, judicial review is limited to examination of the form, but not the substance, of the
certification that only foreign intelligence information is sought; the judge may not "substitute
[his] judgment for that of the executive branch officials." S. REP. No. 95-604, supra note 7, at 48,
reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5700.
21. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a). That the issuance of the order is mandatory when the judge
makes the necessary findings under § 1805 is clear from a reading of the legislative history of the
Act. See S. REP. No. 95-604, supra note 7, at 47, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5698. The judge does have discretion, however, to modify the order in terms of the
period of authorization and the minimization procedures. Id. The order itself must specify the
target of the surveillance, the place or facilities against which the surveillance will be directed, the
type of information sought, the means by which the surveillance will be effected, and the period of
authorization. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(b)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The judge may authorize elec-
tronic surveillance for a period of up to ninety days. In the case of surveillance of a foreign
government, faction of a foreign government, or entity openly controlled by a foreign government,
thd order may authorize surveillance for up to one year. Id. § 1805(d)(1). Extensions of any order
require reapplication and new findings as required for the original order. Id. § 1805(d)(2).
22. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802(a)(1)(A)(i) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). "Official" foreign powers in-
clude definitions (1), (2), and (3) within § 1801(a), quoted in note 14 supra.
23. Id. § 1802(a)(1)(A)(ii).
24. Id. § 1802(a)(1)(B). Further protection is provided by id. § 1801(h)(4), which requires
that any communication of a United States person that is intercepted pursuant to warrantless
surveillance under id. § 1802(a) must be destroyed within 24 hours unless a court order is ob-
tained. See H. CONF. REP. No. 95-1720, supra note 7, at 25, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 5804.
25. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(a)(1)(C) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
26. Id. § 1805(e).
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time.27 One of the judges designated under the Act must be notified at
the time of the authorization, and an application for a court order ap-
proving the surveillance must be made to that judge within twenty-four
hours.28 If the application is denied or the surveillance is terminated
without an order having been issued, any information obtained is inad-
missible as evidence in any proceeding, and the judge may inform any
United States person subject to the surveillance of its occurrence. 29
Prior to the enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978, the only electronic surveillance legislation that specifically ad-
dressed the issue of Presidential authority in the national security area
was-Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968.30 Section 802 of title III provided that nothing in title III or sec-
tion 605 of the Communications Act of 193431 was to limit the Presi-
dent's constitutional power "to obtain foreign intelligence information
deemed essential to the security of the United States or to protect na-
tional security information against foreign intelligence activities."32
27. Id.
28. The Attorney General must make this application whether or not the surveillance is ter-
minated within the 24 hour period or the information sought is obtained. S. REP. No. 95-604,
supra note 7, at 52, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5703. The Attorney
General must also ensure that the minimization procedures of the Act are followed. 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 1805(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
29. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1805(e), 18060) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
30. Title III was the congressional response to the Supreme Court decisions in Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). S. REP. No. 1097, supra
note I, at 27-28, reprinted in [19681 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2113. In Berger, the Court
declared a New York eavesdropping statute unconstitutional and set forth the standards of rea-
sonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment that such statutes would be required to
meet. 388 U.S. at 58-60. The Court placed particular emphasis upon the requirement that police
officers describe conversations sought with specificity, a factor bearing on the finding of probable
cause. Id. at 57-58. In Katz, the Court overruled the "trespass" doctrine of Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), and held that warrantless electronic interception of an individual's
conversations is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment,
even if no physical trespass is involved. 389 U.S. at 353. Katz, however, carefully excluded na-
tional security surveillances from its holding. Id. at 358 n.23. See generally Dash, Katz-Varia.
tions on a Theme by Berger, 17 CATH. U.L. REv. 296 (1968). Congress employed the
constitutional standards delineated in Berger and Katz in drafting title III, which limits the use of
all electronic surveillance to investigation of specified crimes by law enforcement officials author-
ized by a court order issued upon a showing of probable cause. See generally S. REP. No. 1097,
supra note 1, at 96-107, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2153-63; Note,
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance-Title III ofthe Crime ControlAct of 1968, 23 RUTGERS
L. REV. 319 (1969).
31. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 605,48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1976)). The Act reads in pertinent part:
[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such
intercepted communications to any person ....
32. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)
(1970)) (repealed 1978), quoted in note 2 supra.
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Nor was there to be any limitation on the President's power to protect
the nation against hostile acts of a foreign power, overthrow by force or
other unlawful means, or any other clear and present danger to the
structure or existence of the government. 3 The last line of section 802
provided for the introduction of evidence obtained by national security
surveillance "where such interception was reasonable. '3 4 The scope of
"reasonable" national security surveillances was thus an issue for judi-
cial interpretation.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue only once. In United
States v. United'States District Court (Keith),a the Court held that
prior judicial approval ii required for purely domestic security surveil-
lance, even when there is fear of a direct threat to national security. 6
In reaching its decision, the Court held that title III was essentially neu-
tral toward the President's constitutional powers and that the latter
must be examined independently of the statute.3 ' Accordingly, the
Court adopted a balancing approach with the goal of accommodating
both the President's duty to protect national security and the individ-
ual's right to privacy and free expression. 8
Recognizing that national security surveillance served a legitimate
governmental need, the Court first inquired whether prior judicial re-
view was necessary to protect the first and fourth amendment rights
involved. 9 The Court reasoned that unrestrained surveillance pursu-
ant to the vague concept of "domestic security" posed a grave threat to
the rights of privacy and political expression, and thus concluded that a
total departure from the fourth amendment warrant requirement was
not appropriate.4 0 The Court next examined the compatibility of the
warrant requirement with executive needs. After dismissing the gov-
ernment's arguments of judicial incompetence regarding internal secur-
ity matters and the threat of security leaks, the Court reasoned that the
additional burden imposed upon the government by pre-surveillance
review was minimal and fully justified in light of the expected benefits
of safeguarding constitutional rights.4 ' The Court thus held that na-
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
36. Id. at 323-24.
37. Id. at 308.
38. Id. at 314-15.
39. Id. at 315.
40. Id. at 320.
41. Id. at 321.
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tional security surveillance in the domestic context does not constitute
the type of special circumstance that justifies an exception to the war-
rant requirement.42
The Court in Keith specifically declined to address the issue of
warrantless security surveillance involving foreign powers or their
agents.43 Since that decision, however, two lower federal courts have
considered this question. Acknowledging the President's "inherent
power" in the conduct of foreign affairs and the strong public interest
in a continuous flow of foreign intelligence information, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in United States v.
Brown,' and for the Third Circuit, in United States v. Butenko,45 held
that the prior review requirements of the fourth amendment are inap-
plicable to foreign intelligence surveillance. In neither case, however,
did the court attempt to delineate the scope of this exception to the
warrant requirement.46 The consequence of these inconclusive deci-
sions and of the silence of the Supreme Court was an uncertain and
ambiguous exemption from prior judicial review for electronic surveil-
lance of foreign powers and their agents within the United States.47
Enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
has filled the gap left by title III and answered the question avoided by
the Supreme Court. By providing a specific charter for the conduct of
42. Id.
43. Id. at 321-22.
44. 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
45. 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1975).
46. The Butenko court even suggested that a case-by-case application of this exception
should be left to the "good faith" of the Executive, subject to the sanctions available during post
hoe review. 494 F.2d at 605.
Furthermore, the facts of the two cases provide little assistance in distinguishing domestic
security surveillance from surveillance in the foreign context for the purposes of this warrant
clause exception. In Brown, defendant was convicted under the Federal Firearms Act for trans-
porting firearms interstate while under indictment. The warrantless foreign intelligence wiretaps
challenged by defendant were found to be both lawful and unrelated to the prosecutor's case.
Consequently, the purpose and contents of the surveillance remained undisclosed. 484 F.2d at
426. In Butenko, defendants were convicted of conspiring to transmit national defense informa-
tion to a foreign government. This activity was so clearly within the ambit of "foreign intelli-
gence" that the court's decision to find the warrantless surveillance lawful did little to clarify the
domestic intelligence-foreign intelligence distinction.
47. The ambiguous situations would be those in which a domestic organization's actions have
a significant impact on foreign affairs, or a substantial portion of the group's members are foreign
or foreign nationals. Would these organizations properly fall within the Brown-Butenko exception
to the warrant clause requirement, and if so, what is the dividing line between significant and
insignificant impact or substantial and insubstantial portions? The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit has rendered its opinion on the first situation. In
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976), the court
held that warrantless surveillance of a domestic organization may not be justified on the ground
that the organization's activity "affected foreign relations." Id. at 653.
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foreign intelligence surveillance by the government, Congress has come
down clearly on the side of careful judicial supervision. Furthermore,
the Act significantly limits the warrant clause exception suggested by
the lower federal courts. 48
Evaluation of the warrant requirements of the Act might best be
made along the lines of the balancing approach adopted by the
Supreme Court in Keith. Thus the utility of the Act's warrant require-
ment in protecting the constitutional rights of individuals subjected to
surveilance4 9 can be balanced against the extent to which those war-
rant requirements impede the legitimate functions of the government in
gathering necessary foreign intelligence information.5
An important goal of the fourth amendment warrant requirement
is to ensure careful consideration and justification by the government
of the need for the particular surveillance.5' Only in this manner will
all questionable or illegal surveillances come to light.5" The Act ad-
dresses this goal by requiring that each application for an order author--
izing electronic surveillance set forth the identity of the surveillance
target and the justification for believing that the target is a foreign
power or agent of a foreign power 3 and be accompanied by a sup-
ported certification that the information sought is foreign intelligence
48. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra.
49. The suggestion of the Supreme Court in United States Dist. Court (Keith) that both first
and fourth amendment rights are threatened by electronic surveillance for the purpose of domestic
security, see notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra, is no less applicable in the foreign intel-
ligence field. To the extent that the surveillance intercepts communications of political dissenters,
for example, first amendment rights are implicated. The chilling effect upon the exercise of these
rights as a result of such surveillances is no less likely in light of the objection that foreign security
surveillances are targeted exclusively toward foreign agents or organizations. An innocuous do-
mestic group may become a target based upon the existence of a single foreign agent among its
membership or a suspicion of foreign ties.
50. Indeed, the legislative history invites this method of analysis: "[The Act] is designed to
permit the Government to gather necessary foreign intelligence information by means of elec-
tronic surveillance but under limitations and according to procedural guidelines which will better
safeguard the rights of individuals." S. REP. No. 95-604, supra note 7, at 9, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5660.
51. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) ("The basic purpose of
[the fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials."). See
generally Note, Foreign Security Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 87 HARV. L. REV. 976,
985-92 (1974).
52. In the absence of a warrant requirement a large number of surveillances go unreviewed,
unless the target of the surveillance becomes the defendant in a criminal prosecution and the
government attempts to introduce the fruits of the surveillance into evidence. This is particularly
true in the case of national security surveillance, which tends to be "strategic" in nature and
directed toward general information gathering. United States v. United States Dist. Court
(Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972).
53. See notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra.
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information unobtainable by normal investigative techniques.-4 In re-
viewing the application for an order, however, the judge need only find
"probable cause" to believe that the target is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power. Unless that target is a United States person,
the judge may not "go behind" the certification to determine whether
the desired information is actually foreign intelligence information.5"
The traditional view of the fourth amendment's probable cause
requirement is that authorization of a warrant must be based on proba-
ble cause to believe that "the evidence sought will aid in a particular
apprehension or conviction. ' 56 Clearly, the probable cause require-
ments of the Act diverge from this traditional interpretation. The Act
focuses the judicial finding upon the target of the surveillance, not the
evidence sought. Consequently, the fourth amendment's prohibition
against general warrants may be threatened. The certification that the
surveillance seeks only foreign intelligence information places minimal
limitations on the scope of the intrusion into communications of the
targeted person or group. 7 Essentially, the government has the right
under a judicially approved order, subject to the minimization require-
ments, to intercept conversations continuously or at random for at least
ninety days in order to gather all relevant "foreign intelligence infor-
mation."58
Two arguments can be made, however, to justify this deviation
from the strict probable cause standard. First, although the probable
cause finding of the Act is based on the mere identification of the target
as a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, the terms are defined
to limit foreign intelligence surveillance of United States persons to sit-
uations involving the commission of a crime. The term "agent of a
foreign power" includes only those United States persons knowingly
engaged in criminal activity against the United States; therefore, a
54. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
55. See note 20 supra.
56. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967); see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56-59
(1967).
57. Verification that the information sought is "foreign intelligence information," the focus
under a traditional probable cause inquiry, is permitted only if the target of the surveillance is a
United States person. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra. Even in that event, the
judge is limited to a "clearly erroneous" standard in reviewing the certification. See id.
58. The right to conduct continuous surveillance is a tremendous power, permitting law en-
forcement officers to intrude upon the rightfully private aspects of a person's life in the search for
criminal activity. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 62 (1967). Such a broad grant was
found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1968), and led
the Court to require that the conversations sought by the surveillance be described with specificity
in the finding of probable cause. Id. at 58-59.
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judge must find probable cause to believe that a United States person is
committing a crime against the federal government before he can find
that that person is an "agent." The probable cause requirement thus
appears to be met in situations involving United States persons, al-
though the information sought from the surveillance will not necessar-
ily be used in a particular criminal prosecution.
This argument, however, cannot be made with respect to aliens.
An alien need not be engaged in criminal activity to fall within the
statutory definition of "agent;" he need only be acting within the
United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power or engaged
in "clandestine intelligence activities . . . contrary to the interests of
the United States."59 The probable cause requirements with regard to
aliens under the Act thus deviate from the traditional formulation of
probable cause as a belief that the evidence sought is directly related to
a specific criminal activity. In light of the recent trend by the Supreme
Court toward full fourth amendment protection for aliens,6" the Act's
probable cause requirements for aliens are of questionable constitu-
tional validity.6' Furthermore, the nonspecific nature of this provision
increases the likelihood that the conversations of United States persons
lawfully associating with the alien "agents" will be indiscriminantly in-
tercepted.
The definition of "foreign power" suffers from similar defects. Pri-
marily included are foreign governments themselves or factions that
are essentially extensions of foreign governments and organizations en-
59. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(1)(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
.60. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (warrantless search of
alien's automobile by roving patrol 25 miles north of Mexican border declared unconstitutional
because "[i]n the absence of probable cause or consent, that search violated the petitioner's Fourth
Amendment right to be free of 'unreasonable searches and seizures' "); Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) ("classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or
race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny"); Au Yi Lau v. United States
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("aliens in this country
are sheltered by the Fourth Amendment in common with citizens"). But see Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217, 232-34 (1960) (dictum) (arrest of alien prior to deportation proceeding on
"administrative warrant" that would not have satisfied the fourth amendment was constitutionally
valid). See generally Gordon, The 4lien and the Constitution, 9 CALIF. W.L. REv. 1 (1972).
61. The framers of the Act were cognizant of this discrepancy in treatment of United States
persons and aliens. S. REP. No. 95-604, supra note 7, at 20-21, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 5671-73. Their justification was that, given the specificity of the two cate-
gories within the definition of "agent" and the compelling national security interests, the bifur-
cated standard is lawful. Id. Aliens who are officers or employees of a foreign power are
considered "likely sources of foreign intelligence information" and thus reasonable targets, even
in the absence of participation in criminal activity. Id. at 20, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 5671: Furthermore, those aliens engaged in "clandestine intelligence activities"
for a foreign power must do so in a manner harmful to national security to be considered agents
under the Act. Id. at 21-22, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5673.
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gaged in terrorist or espionage activities for a foreign government.62
Surveillance of communications between members of the first group is
exempt from the requirement of prior judicial review, provided no
United States person is involved.63 To the extent that this group
includes foreign embassies and consulates within the United States, an
exemption based on this definition is reasonable.64 This first group of
"foreign powers," however, also includes any "faction of a foreign na-
tion. . . , not substantially composed of United States persons" '65 and
any "entity" that is openly controlled by a foreign government. 66 The
definition is thus sufficiently ambiguous to include virtually any foreign
affiliated organization regarded by the United States government as a
potential threat to national security.67 This broad discretion in the use
of warrantless surveillance therefore threatens the constitutional rights
of all aliens and United States persons lawfully associated with such
organizations.
Ironically, the second group of organizations included within the
definition of foreign power-those engaged in terrorism or espionage
for a foreign government 64-are never exempted from the judicial re-
view requirements of the Act, even though such organizations are more
clearly involved in criminal activity within the United States than are
62. See note 14 supra.
63. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra.
64. In balancing the competing interests, it seems clear that the government's claim of rea-
sonableness would be easily supported in such surveillances. Surveillances of these targets will
likely be very productive and easily justifiable on national security grounds. Furthermore, the
potential danger to privacy interests from warrantless surveillance of embassies and consulates is
minimal or nonexistent. First, the interests of United States persons are not involved. See note 24
and accompanying text supra. Second, the interests of embassy or consulate personnel are less
deserving of full constitutional protection. An embassy compound is regarded as sovereign terri-
tory of the represented foreign nation and constitutional protection does not extend to the interest
of aliens on foreign soil. Furthermore, embassy personnel, given the nature of their work, which
usually includes surveillance of United States targets, have less "expectation of privacy," see Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), than other aliens residing or working within the United
States.
65. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(a)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
66. Id. § 1801(a)(3).
67. With respect to the "entity" definition, the legislative history suggests that the "question
whether a group, commercial enterprise, or organization comes within the scope of this definition
is one for the court to answer on the basis of a probable cause standard." S. Rep. No. 95-701,
supra note 9, at 17, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5736. If, however, the
surveillance satisfies the requirements of 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802(a) (West Cum. Supp, 1979), see text
accompanying notes 22-25 supra, and is targeted toward such an "entity," the surveillance order is
not subject to review by the court. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
68. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(a)(4), (6) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The legislative history explains
that the id. § 1801(6) definition of "entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government"
covers those situations in which the "entity" is actually a "cover for espionage activities," S. REP.
No. 95-604, supra note 7, at 20, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5671.
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other organizations that may be exempted. The one problem that
arises with respect to the Act's coverage of this second group is that the
"foreign based political organizations"6 9 provision, which provides for
surveillance based upon the organization's status per se, is clearly in
contravention of the traditional probable cause formulation.70
The second, and perhaps better, argument justifying the Act's de-
viance from traditional probable cause standards is derived from the
suggestion by the Supreme Court in Keith that standards of review ap-
plicable to domestic security surveillance may be less stringent than
those prescribed by title III for surveillance of "ordinary" crime.7 The
Court recognized that the targets of security surveillances are often less
readily identifiable than the targets of other title III surveillances, and
consequently, the surveillance itself must be broader in scope. The
traditional formulation of probable cause would thus be too restrictive
for effective security surveillance.
Although the Court in Keith did not address the issue, this argu-
ment appears to be equally applicable to the foreign intelligence sur-
veillance context.7" The foreign nature of a threat indicates that it can
never be fully eliminated, as can a domestic threat, by way of criminal
prosecution. Therefore, the government must necessarily be interested
in ongoing, "strategic" intelligence gathering. Subjecting such surveil-
69. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(a)(5) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
70. This provision harks back to the Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 22, 64 Stat. 987
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 U.S.C.), which designated the Communist Party
as a forbidden organization and permitted deportation of past and present alien members. Al-
though the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Internal Security Act as not viola-
tive of due process, Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), a requirement of "meaningful
membership" was developed in order to protect casual or unwitting Communist Party members
from deportation. Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1963); Rowoldt v.
Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115, 120 (1957). Moreover, the Court has recently adopted an attitude of strict
construction toward deportation statutes. See note 60 supra.
To the extent that the Court continues or extends this cautious attitude toward the denial of
certain constitutional protections to aliens, see Gordon, supra note 60, at 32, use of the "foreign-
based political organization" definition within the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act as a basis
for finding probable cause may be of questionable constitutional validity. Of the six alternative
definitions of "foreign power," see note 14 supra, "political organization" is the least consistent
with the particularized probable cause requirement since there is no proof of illegal activity re-
quired. In contrast, the Internal Security Act of 1950 provision forbidding membership in the
Communist Party was based on an express declaration of the illegality of that organization. Sub-
versive Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 2, 64 Stat. 987.
71. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972). The Court,
however, did not suggest an alternative probable cause standard.
72. This argument assumes that foreign intelligence surveillance is no more offensive to per-
sonal rights than domestic surveillance. To the extent that the former involves only nonresident
aliens and foreign agents not deserving of first and fourth amendment protection, foreign intelli-
gence surveillance may even be less offensive. But see Note, supra note 51, at 985-88; note 60 and
accompanying text supra.
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lances to a probable cause standard of review based upon the goal of an
identifiable prosecution would again be too restrictive for effective in-
formation gathering.
The Supreme Court has allowed lower standards of probable
cause in other, noncriminal contexts. Maintenance of effective regula-
tory schemes, for example, often requires periodic inspections to assure
compliance by the regulated class. The Court has recognized that,
while the fourth amendment is applicable to administrative searches, 73
the goals of these regulations may well be frustrated if the inspections
are permitted only in response to actual or suspected violations. This is
certainly true in the contexts of housing codes74 and the Occupational
Safety and Health Act,75 which are designed to prevent dangerous liv-
ing and working conditions from developing. Effective enforcement of
these regulations consequently requires periodic inspections of broad
segments of the regulated class. The Court has responded to these gov-
ernmental needs by holding that a relaxed standard of probable cause,
based upon a showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to
a particular dwelling, '76 is sufficient for the conduct of certain adminis-
trative. searches. 77 The Court has reasoned that this formulation of
probable cause is not only necessary to protect the governmental inter-
ests represented by the regulatory statutes, but is also sufficient to pro-
tect the privacy interests affected by the administrative inspections,
which have been discounted to an extent by the Court because of the
noncriminal nature of the inspections.78
The relative interests at stake under a program of national security
73. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 324 (1978). Barlow'r is the most recent pronun-
ciation by the Supreme Court on the application of fourth amendment protections to administra-
tive searches conducted pursuant to federal regulatory statutes. The standard was established in
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967),
in which the Court held that warrants were required for the conduct of municipal housing code
inspections. 387 U.S. at 542; 387 U.S. at 534. Since the holdings in these two cases were limited to
their facts, however, the Court was free to fashion a different conclusion when reviewing warrant-
less inspections of federally licensed businesses. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,
316 (1972), in which the Court reasoned that the pervasiveness of the regulatory schemes dimin-
ished the petitioner's claim of privacy. Barlow's also involved a regulated business, subjected to
Occupational Safety and Health Act inspections. In that case, however, the Court refused to ex-
pand the exception to the Camara/See rule, and held that warrantless inspections pursuant to
federal regulatory schemes are permissible only in certain narrow circumstances. 436 U.S. at 313-
14; see Note, 57 N.C.L. REv. 320 (1979).
74. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1967).
75. See Note, supra note 73, at 331.
76. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
77. Id.; Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1978).
78. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
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surveillances differ substantially, however, from those involved in ad-
ministrative inspections. On the individual's side of the balance, first as
well as fourth amendment rights are threatened if citizens are deterred
from associating with activities or organizations that the government
may suspect of being potential security threats and thus likely surveil-
lance subjects.79 Also, security surveillances, unlike administrative
searches, often lead to criminal prosecutions, further threatening the
interests of individuals subjected to surveillance. Although these con-
siderations seem to support the need for the traditional, particularized
standard for probable cause in order to protect the public from unrea-
sonable surveillances, the competing governmental interests militate in
favor of quite the opposite conclusion. As suggested above, limiting
security surveillances to instances in which there was probable cause to
believe that the surveillance would uncover criminal evidence might
frustrate the goals of foreign intelligence gathering. Especially in mat-
ters of military preparedness, strategic intelligence gathering is neces-
sary to understand the development of a foreign power's posture in
relation to the United States. In this light, a relaxed standard of proba-
ble cause is necessary to permit periodic or continuous intelligence
gathering.
The probable cause formulation contained in the Act arguably rec-
onciles these competing interests. This formulation protects the rights
and interests of individuals by permitting surveillance of only those
targets that fall within a specified class of "foreign powers" or "foreign
agents." If these classes are sufficiently narrow in scope, then innocent
persons are protected against privacy invasions. Once the court finds
probable cause to believe that the target is within one of the designated
classes, the surveillance is unrestricted, except with respect to minimi-
zation of intrusion and duration. Thus the government is not hindered
by requirements of proof that criminal evidence is sought. Finally, this
formulation of probable cause is arguably consistent with the adminis-
trative probable cause standard that the Supreme Court has found to
be valid. Both are based on the definition of a class of targets rather
than upon a showing that criminal evidence is sought, both can be jus-
tified by overriding government needs, and both govern "searches" reg-
ulated by legislative guidelines and standards.8 0
79. See generally A. WESTIN, supra note 58, at 57-63.
80. These legislative standards provide a check against governmental abuse of the authority
available under the relaxed probable cause formulations and distinguish intelligence surveillance
from ordinary search and seizure, in which the officer exercises a greater degree of discretion in
executing the warrant.
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The extent to which interposition of prior judicial review by the
Act impedes the President in the performance of his constitutional obli-
gations to provide for national security may be assessed in terms of the
practical objections asserted by several courts: problems of delay,8'
concerns about secrecy,8" and the complexity of foreign intelligence is-
sues and the ability of judges to deal with them.83
The first objection arises when fulfillment of the warrant require-
ment prevents initiation of a surveillance immediately. The conceiva-
ble result is the failure to intercept crucial communications during the
period of delay. The delay may result from the necessity of presenting
technical information for review by a judge who is unfamiliar with it
and from the need for additional precautions against security leaks.
The Act responds to this objection in two ways. First, the designation
of seven federal judges, with instructions to handle all warrant applica-
tions as expeditiously as possible, creates a reviewing court whose ex-
pertise in the area of foreign intelligence surveillance can only increase
over time.84 Second, the Act provides a narrowly drawn exception to
the warrant requirement for cases of emergency.85 This exception is
comparable to the one permitted in ordinary criminal cases in which
destruction or removal of evidence is imminent.8 6
The second argument asserted against the warrant requirement is
that secret information presented for judicial review may easily be
"leaked." Although the Court rejected this argument in Keith,87 the
potential danger may be greater in the foreign security context than in
the domestic context. Certainly the contents of the certification and the
judicial finding of probable cause probe deeply into information that, if
revealed, would threaten the safety and continued effectiveness of gov-
ernment agents, particularly those operating abroad.88 The Act goes
far in minimizing the number of persons with access to security infor-
mation, however, because only one of the seven designated judges re-
81. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881
(1974).
82. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 319 (1972).
83. United States v. Butenko, 318 F. Supp. 66, 72 (D.N.J. 1970), afd, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.),
cer. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
84. The countervailing consideration is that a delay may occur in reaching one of those seven
judges.
85. See notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra.
86. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
87. 407 U.S. at 320-21.
88. See S. REP. No. 95-604, supra note 7, at 47, reprinted in E19781 U.S. COD  Coto. & AD.
NEws at 5698-99.
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views a particular application and because the proceedings must be
conducted ex parte. Further precautions not specified by the Act may
also be taken to protect against security leaks; for exampld, the names
of informants or secret agents need not be revealed 9 and the Justice
Department might supply all of the necessary clerical assistance. 90
The third concern with the burden of the warrant requirement is
the possibility of judicial error in the review of complex foreign intelli-
gence issues. The judiciary's expertise in determining what constitutes
"foreign intelligence" is limited; judges are more comfortable deciding
whether the traditional elements of probable cause-evidence of a
crime-are present. Here again, the designation of seven judges with
the duty of reviewing all government applications provides a safeguard
against errors inasmuch as judicial expertise will probably increase
with experience. Furthermore, the finding of probable cause to believe
that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power is governed by fairly clear and manageable, albeit broad,
standards. Only when the target is a United States person must the
judge "look behind" the government's certification that the information
sought is "foreign intelligence information." Even then, the judge need
only find that the certification is not "clearly erroneous"; he will most
likely defer to the greater expertise of the government officials and
grant any application that is colorable. Indeed, the Act specifically ex-
empts those surveillances that are clearly directed toward communica-
tions between specifically enumerated foreign powers alone. These
surveillances-embassy taps and bugs for example-are logically left
outside the scope of the warrant requirement because of the overriding
governmental interests.91
The Act represents a minimal burden upon the governmental con-
duct of foreign intelligence gathering-indeed, one may wonder
whether the process may eventually become a mere "rubber-stamp,"
with the constitutional rights of individuals no more protected than in
the absence of a warrant requirement. This result, however, is unlikely.
The possibility of even an occasional rejection of a government appli-
cation should be sufficient to force officials to carefully justify their ac-
tivities, especially with respect to the more closely scrutinized
surveillances of United States persons. Nevertheless, the flexibility in-
89. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (affidavit submitted for purpose of
establishing probable cause need only demonstrate affiant's belief that informant was credible and
his information reliable; informant's identity need not be disclosed).
90. See 407 U.S. at 321.
91. See note 64 supra.
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corporated into the Act to accommodate governmental interests places
great responsibility upon the court to construe the specified classes of
"foreign powers" and "foreign agents" quite narrowly. Only by limit-
ing the definitions to individuals and groups clearly engaged in crimi-
nal activity or to those otherwise undeserving of full constitutional
protection will the statutory standard arguably comport with the tradi-
tional notion of probable cause. 9z The conduct of the district court
judges appointed to review applications under the Act will thus deter-
mine whether the Act provides a viable means of arresting the erosion
of constitutional fights that accompanies the use of electronic surveil-
lance as a means of gathering foreign intelligence information.
JOHNSON A. SALISBURY
92. See notes 56-70 and accompanying text supra.
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